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Abstract
Economic explanations for the fertility transition focus on the role of returns to schooling,
especially for women, which have encouraged women to obtain more education and facilitated the
rise in women’s wages relative to men’s. The private opportunity costs of children have therefore
increased, and parents have been motivated to substitute child schooling for additional births
Declines in fertility have proceeded unevenly, first across the high income countries, and more
recently across the low income countries. The cross sectional differentials in fertility are also
frequently analyzed in household surveys, suggesting parallels with the cross-country
comparisons. At an aggregate level, states have simultaneously legislated socialized support for
the consumption of the elderly, which has eroded the incentives for childbearing, and subsidized
child human capital through schools and public health programs, which has encouraged parents to
demand fewer, higher quality, children.
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1.

Approaches of Economics and Demography to the Fertility Transition
With the establishment of modern economic growth, fertility has tended to decline, first across

high income countries starting largely in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and then occurring
even more rapidly across most low income countries in the last quarter of the twentieth century
(Kuznets, 1966; Schultz, 1981). Economic models of the allocation of time and wealth of families
among production and consumption activities suggest several hypotheses linking changes in the
economic environment in which people live to their reproductive demands and fertility (Becker, 1960;
Mincer, 1963). Empirical counterparts for the price, income, and environmental constraints on
people’s fertility choices have been used to explain aspects of fertility and other related outcomes of
the family, strengthening the view that this household demand model is a source of insights into the
determinants of the historic fertility transition (T.W. Schultz, 1974; Becker, 1981).
This economic approach to fertility determinants has been criticized by those who believe that
fertility is not a rational response to changing economic conditions (Cleland and Wilson, 1987). The
proposed alternative to the economic approach, called “ideational change” emphasizes social
interactions, but has not yet evolved to a form that is empirically distinguishable. However, research
is trying to quantify the role of groups external to the family, such as peers and neighborhoods, and
to interactions between family members as postulated in cooperative and non-cooperative game
strategies within families. But because these groups are generally self selected, it is complex to
specify the factors that affect the formation of the group and do not also affect the behavior of
individuals who enter such groups (Heckman, 1979; Manski, 1995). There is active debate on how
to apply the economic framework and to exploit statistically cross sectional and time series variation
in fertility to improve our understanding of the determinants of fertility (e.g., Schultz, 1997).
2

There is a fundamental methodological divide between those who want to describe a
“structural model” that involves the interaction between choices made at the household level,
including those choices spanning an adult’s lifetime, such as between a woman’s fertility, marriage,
and labor force history, and those who investigate a “reduced form model” where only the fixed
constraints on household choice are considered as potential explanatory variables -- market prices,
income sources, technologies, and the environment. It is widely recognized that the associations
between lifetime choices represent more (or less) than a simple causal effect of one choice on the
other. These covariations between family choices embody possible effects transmitted in both
directions, effects of unobserved factors which impact both outcomes, and heterogeneity due to
differences in individual preferences (Schultz, 1981). Strong identification restrictions are generally
required to estimate from non-experimental data the critical parameters to such “structural models,”
and therefore the empirical conclusions drawn from them are often controversial, because they
depend on a host of untested and debatable modeling choices (Manski, 1995).
The alternative approach is to estimate fertility as a function of explanatory variables that are
not family choice variables or not likely to be impacted by unobserved factors that could also affect
fertility. By delimiting the potential list of explanatory variables, these “reduced form” relationships
represent a summation of the direct effect of the environmentally fixed constraints on the couple’s
fertility, plus the possible indirect effect of the same constraints on fertility that operate through the
modification of other lifetime choice variables, such as the woman’s age at marriage, extent of labor
force activity outside of her home, contraceptive and sexual behavior, etc. The limitation of reduced
form estimates is that they do not necessarily clarify the mechanism by which the constraints impact
fertility, for example through the timing of marriage, or the adoption within marriage of various so3

called “natural” or “unnatural” forms of birth control. The strength of reduced form estimates is that
they claim to provide an unbiased approximation for the total effect of the constraint on fertility,
which is often a central concern of the social scientist, forecaster, or policy maker.
Some historical demographers assign special importance to the moment when married women
begin to restrict their birth rates in response to their prior number of births, or surviving children
(Coale and Watkins, 1986). Although this may be a well-defined and interesting threshold that
predicts the onset of the long term decline in fertility in certain European populations, other
populations may adopt other mechanisms to reach their changing fertility goals, such as a change in
median age at marriage (i.e. Malthus’ preventive check), an increase in celibacy or the proportion
who never marry in a birth cohort (Weir, 1984), an increase in the spacing of births within marriage,
as appears to be evident in Africa today (Caldwell et al., 1992; Shapiro and Tabashe, 2000), or a
change in non-marital fertility. Even in the region of Northern Europe, standard measures of the
emergence of parity-specific fertility control within marriages are not precisely defined by existing
data (Guinnane, et al. 1994). Thus, economists generally consider comprehensive measures of cohort
fertility, and do not focus on one component, such as marital fertility.
2.

Stages of the Demographic Transition
The “demographic transition” refers to a sequence of three periods. In the first period,

fertility and mortality rates are high and mortality tends to be highly variable, with population growth
fluctuating widely, about a moderate long run trend of growth or decline. Short run responses in
fertility (and mortality) can be attributed to cycles in weather or harvests or possibly to other
exogenous variables using time series statistical methods, such as vector-auto-regression.
In the second period, age-specific mortality rates decrease gradually, raising life expectancy
4

at birth from 30-35 years in pre-industrial Europe, to 70-75 today in the high income countries, and
from 25-30 years in the low income countries in the 1920s, to levels which today range from about
45-73, excluding countries ravaged by war or the AIDS epidemic. This second period is one of
accelerating population growth, which some observers such as Malthus attributed to improved food
supplies, and more specifically to nutrition, often initiated by technical progress in agriculture,
followed by improved industrial productivity, and advances in transportation and communication
(Fogel 1999). A free press capable of publicizing food shortfalls in the twentieth century may have
further alleviated excess mortality in the wake of periodic famines. Improvements in private and
public health technologies are assigned an important role in reducing mortality, but not much before
the start of the twentieth century.
In the third period, the secular decline in fertility begins, after which the number of births per
woman falls by more than half, from five or six to about two in the high income countries, and six to
eight to about two or three in most low income countries. When historically high fertility levels have
declined by more than 10 percent, they are not expected to rise again on a sustained basis (National
Research Council 2000). Medium term swings in fertility are nonetheless distinguished from time
series, occurring in response to business cycles (e.g., the post-World War II baby boom), wars, and
economic shocks, as during the transition from centrally planned to market oriented economies in the
1990s in Eastern Europe and Russia, or recently due to economic reversals in Sub-Sahara Africa.
3.

Economic Determinants of Fertility
Notestein (1945) described the early dimensions of the demographic transition, and speculated

on the economic pressures which he expected to reduce fertility in the low income world: rising cost
of children in urban life, individualistic promotion of child health and education. Economic models
5

of a lifetime fertility choice emphasize different facets of this decision process, but the trade-off
between quantity of children and their quality (i.e., education and health) has become a central feature
(Becker 1960, Mincer 1963, Schultz 1981). Because women’s time in child-care is a large fraction
of the modern opportunity cost of fertility, her allocation of time is treated as jointly determined with
fertility. Many cross-sectional and a few time-series studies have proceeded to relate statistically
these fixed constraints to fertility outcomes.
A couple’s lifetime wealth (endowments of human capital and nonhuman capital) is expected
to increase with modern economic growth, and to encourage parents to demand more children, if the
relative costs and functions of children did not change (Becker 1960, Schultz 1981). However, for
reasons discussed below, the opportunity cost of children increased along with the cost of other
goods and activities that complement the rearing of children, whereas the private price of some
substitutes for children has declined, such as old-age pensions and health care, or have been socialized
and subsidized by governments. Marked improvements in the technology of birth control were
developed in the 1950s translating into the rapid diffusion of the pill (oral steroid contraceptive) and
the IUD (intrauterine device) to most regions of the world. The monetary and psychic cost and
inconvenience (independent of coitus) of avoiding too many births was reduced, and should thereby
have reduced the number of births. Family planning programs are not, however, a necessary
condition for the occurrence of a fertility transition, because birth rates declined in high income
countries without the benefit of new control technologies, or of family planning extension activities
designed to foster the adoption of birth control. Finally, improvements in child health technology
increased the proportion of births that survived to adulthood. These health developments put
downward pressure on birth rates, under two assumptions: Parent reproductive goals are defined
6

primarily in terms of their number of surviving children, and these demands for survivors are highly
price inelastic (Schultz 1981).
The actual expenditures of a couple on each of their children is not a suitable indicator of the
“market price” of a child on which a couple would base their demand for children. Expenditures per
child are also a family choice, which Becker called the demand for “child quality.” The marketdetermined prices of the inputs that households combine to rear children are the relevant prices that
condition fertility. But, there is no consensus on which inputs to children are most important and how
their unit prices are measured?
If one accepts Becker’s (1960) hypothesis that quality and quantity of children are viewed by
parents as substitutes, and much of the variation in child quality is embodied in the education parents
give their child, then the net price of schooling would affect negatively the demand for quality and
affect positively the demand for quantity of children. There is growing evidence in the twentieth
century that wage returns to schooling increased, and this can be viewed as a decline in the price of
schooling, encouraging parents and societies to invest more resources in the education of children.
If parents view schooling per child as a substitute for numbers of children, as is now often empirically
confirmed (e.g., Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980), the increasing wage return to schooling among
workers should encourage parents to substitute child schooling for number of children. The increase
in wage returns to schooling can be attributed to a technological bias favoring skilled labor, or to a
complementarity in production between the schooling of workers and the accumulating stock of
technical knowledge available in the global economy.
Becker (1981) also assumed that the income elasticity on the demand for child quality was
a larger positive magnitude than the income elasticity on the demand for child quantity. This might
7

also have encouraged parents to substitute child quality for child quantity as their incomes increased
from one generation to the next. Here was a second possible explanation for the anomalous fall in
fertility in a period when per capita income was increasing.
4.

The Increasing Value of Parents’ Time as an Opportunity Cost of Children
In the twentieth century, the fraction of national income paid out to labor has risen, despite

the increase in capital employed per worker and the decrease in hours worked per year per worker
(Kuznets 1966, Fogel 1999). Wage rates have grown relative to per capita income, implying that
consumption activities that use more time of the consumer have become relatively more expensive
over time. Children are thought to be a more “time-intensive commodity” than the average of all
consumption commodities, and thus the opportunity costs for households to produce and consume
a child have risen as parent wages have risen, offsetting some part of the increased demand for
children that might have been expected in a period when per capita income is rising (Mincer 1963,
Becker, 1965).
The household production-consumption model drew attention to gender specialization in
social production, and to the “female time-intensity” of children, thereby suggesting the woman’s
value of time could be a key component in the price of children. In environments where the
opportunity cost of female (i.e., mother’s or child-care giver’s) time is higher, fertility is expected
to be lower, other things equal (Schultz 1981). The market wage of women might thus be an
“opportunity price” variable, and it has notably increased in many countries in the twentieth century
at a time when fertility has fallen. But just as “parental expenditures per child” does not represent
a fixed market-determined price of a child, the woman’s market wage does not represent a fixed price
of a woman’s time input to child rearing. First, the wage a woman receives in the labor force is
8

affected by her prior job experience, which accumulates at different rates depending on her
preferences among types of work and the allocation of her time. Consequently, a woman’s wage is
an endogenous choice variable closely linked to her lifetime allocation of time, which in turn is
intimately related to her fertility decisions (Mincer 1963).
A second problem with the woman’s wage variable is that it is observed only for a selfselected fraction of women who work for a wage in the observation period, and this fraction has
tended to rise over time in many populations, and to differ by socioeconomic strata within a
population. It is possible that women who work for wages are those who receive an unusually high
market wage offer, suggesting that the observed average wage of women overstates the value of time
of an average woman. Conversely, women who are unusually productive in non-wage work, and thus
are less likely to participate in the wage labor force, may still have an above average market-wage
offer, in which case the observed average wage of women would understate the value of time of an
average woman. Sample selection bias could distort the wage as a measure of the value of women’s
time, and thus bias estimates of the woman’s wage effect on fertility, probably overstating the causal
connection in time series (Heckman 1979, Schultz 1981).
5.

Determinants of the Value of Women’s Time and the Cost of Children
The variation in the opportunity price of children that arises from the variation in women’s

opportunity value of their time remains a key economic determinant of fertility, and econometric
procedures are required to estimate the importance of this connection for the fertility transition. In
other words, because the observed wage of women cannot be treated as a fixed determinant of
fertility, it cannot be included in a reduced form equation for fertility. How then, does one
approximate in a more structural model the effect of employment and productive opportunities for
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women on the opportunity cost of a woman’s time, which in turn affects fertility?
One approach to this problem is to employ the woman’s education as a proxy for her wage;
schooling tends to be the best variable available for predicting in the cross-section women’s wages,
just as it is for men’s wages. For most women their human capital investment in schooling is
completed before childbearing starts, and thus the schooling decision can be viewed as predetermined
with respect to fertility. If the schooling decision is made by the child’s parents, it may also be argued
that the woman’s schooling is unaffected by her adult preferences between labor market and fertility
choices, and then schooling may be a satisfactory “instrumental variable” for predicting the adult
lifetime wage opportunities for women, which constrain the choice of fertility.
A second approach is to treat the structure of wages in the local labor market as fixed and
thus independent of the woman’s preferences. This appears to be a reasonable strategy, proceeding
from the individual wage to the community averaged wage, and thus eliminating the idiosyncratic
individual variation in preferences between working and fertility. Analyses of fertility can then include
all women based on the regional wage, and not be restricted to a selected sample of women who are
currently reported working for a wage. But another problem could still bias the estimated effect of
women’s regional wage opportunities on regional or individual fertility. Because an increased in the
labor supplied by women in a region will tend to depress the market-clearing wage women receive
locally, any omitted regional variables that contribute to greater female labor force participation are
expected to also be correlated with lower wages, and hence be correlated with higher fertility.
Consequently, these regional omitted labor supply variables would introduce a positive bias in the
estimated effect of woman’s regional wage on fertility, masking the theoretically expected negative
impact of aggregate demand-induced variation in women’s wages on fertility.
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One estimation strategy to deal with this regional omitted variable problem is to specify a
regional variable that shifts only the aggregate regional economy’s demand for female labor (relative
to the demand for male labor), and thereby affects the local wage available to women (relative to
men). Variables of this form which shift the aggregate demand schedule for women’s labor are
candidates for being an “instrumental variable” that can account for demand-induced variation in
women wages, and can thus be used to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of women’s wages
on fertility. One such demand variable is the regional location of natural resources or the composition
of industries, which influence the gender composition of employment opportunities and wages.
Coal mines, for example, employ mostly men, and communities dependent on coal mines for
their livelihood have relatively low wages for women. Historically, these coal communities in
England and the United States reported relatively high fertility levels, other things equal (Haines
1979). In the Northern provinces of Sweden where the price and quantity of timber increased at the
end of the nineteenth century due to exports, men’s wages increased relative to women’s wages, and
fertility remained high in these regions well into the twentieth century. By contrast, fertility in the
Southern provinces of Sweden declined after the 1860s, as women’s wages increased relative to those
of men, in response to higher output prices for exports of livestock, dairy and food manufactured
products, which employed relatively more women (Schultz 1985). Natural resource exports
strengthen government finances by providing an inelastic source of taxation, notably in the case of
oil exports, with a tendency to sustain customary social institutions that have been associated with
relatively low levels of female education, low female labor force participation, and high levels of
fertility, holding constant for other factors (Schultz, 1994).
Labor economists have noted since the 1960s that in regions where the share of employment
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in certain industries, for examples the services, is relatively large, female labor force participation
rates tend to be higher. The importance of part-time, less-skilled, and physically less-demanding jobs
may thus be associated with a larger share of women in the labor force, and a rise in the economic
status of women relative to men. This form of “female bias” in the industrial composition of local
employment is found to predict increased women’s wages relative to men’s and lower fertility.
Changes in fertility over time can then be explained by changes in factors external to the
household sector which govern the expansion of employment opportunities in industries that hire a
disproportionate share of women (or men). The price of the industry’s output when it is determined
in international markets is one such factor. Terms of trade indexes linked to gender-specific
employment and wages opportunities can predict women’s wages relative to men’s and provide a
basis for estimating how demand-driven variation in women’s employment opportunities influence
fertility. However, these changes in relative prices and employment prospects must be perceived by
couples as sufficiently long term in nature that they feel the need to adapt accordingly their
reproductive goals.
6.

Evidence from European Fertility Transitions
The decline in the price of food grains in Europe in the nineteenth century led to such a

profound reallocation of labor and allied resources. With the opening of the Erie Canal in 1825 and
the reduction in ocean transportation costs, exports from the USA, Russia and other world grain
exporters depressed grain markets across Europe. Although restrictions of trade attempted to protect
domestic agriculture, European farmers gradually adapted to their changing comparative advantage
and left agriculture for urban jobs or emigrated, whereas those who remained in agriculture
reallocated their effort from grain to livestock production and to the expansion of food and dairy
12

processing industries. Because grain production traditionally employed more male labor, and
livestock and dairy production used more female labor, these changing output prices boosted
women’s wages relative to men’s. This reallocation of resources occurred more rapidly where
economies were more open to international trade in agricultural commodities. This transformation
of composition of European agriculture or its consequences on the productive roles of women and
men is not quantitatively studied in the Princeton European Fertility Project, although these changes
could have influenced the diffusion of the fertility transition (Coale and Watkins 1986).
In Sweden, as noted earlier, these agricultural relative price changes were closely associated
with the improvement in women’s wages relative to men’s, and with declines in fertility, by province
over time, starting after 1860. The level of real wages for men was related to younger childbearing,
but not to a change in total fertility rates. About one-third of the 25 percent decline in total fertility
rates for Sweden in the period 1860 to 1910 can be attributed to these externally driven increases of
women’s wage opportunities, whereas the rest of the decline in Swedish fertility in this half century
is associated with urbanization and the increase in child survival, under the assumption that these are
exogenous developments (Schultz 1985). A similar demographic pattern unfolded in Denmark, which
was also relatively open to international agricultural trade, while its demographic transition was only
slightly less rapid than in Sweden.
The German fertility transition has also been analyzed from 1880 to 1910. When regional
persistent or fixed-effects are introduced in the analysis of times series of cross sections, the evidence
of strong partial effects of industrialization and urbanization emerge (Richards 1977). Smaller
regional units were examined in Prussia from 1875 to 1910, with the same regional fixed-effect
specification for fertility (Galloway et al 1994). However, the female labor force participation rates
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are used to explain fertility in what was otherwise a reduced form specification, as though the
changing labor force participation of women was a “fixed constraint” on fertility decisions. Not
surprisingly, this choice variable reflecting women’s time allocation accounts for the largest fraction
of the fertility decline, and if it is jointly determined by women with their fertility, as seems likely, the
reported estimates are subject to simultaneous equation bias and are difficult to interpret as evidence
for any causal model.
7.

Advancement in Women’s Schooling
Another widespread development in the world, which has contributed to increasing the cost

of children relative to most other forms of consumption, is the advance in women’s schooling. In the
USA, by the start of the twentieth century, the gender gap in schooling was modest, except for
college education. But this gap remained substantial in most countries in Southern and Eastern
Europe until after World War I. Moreover, women’s schooling attainment began to gain relative to
that of men in low income countries only in the last few decades. This progress has been particularly
sluggish in South Asia where the fertility transition has also been most gradual. Given the empirical
tendency for wages to increase for women by at least the same percentage as they do for men when
they obtain an additional year of schooling, the closure in the gender gap in schooling implies that
women’s wages are likely to continue to increase in most parts of the low income world for some
time, and indeed increase at a more rapid rate than will the wages of men (Schultz 1995). The factors
that have triggered these differential trends in the schooling of women and men have not been
thoroughly studied, but the expansion of women’s schooling closely parallels the decline in fertility
across high and low income countries since 1960. Indeed, changes in women’s schooling accounts
for the largest share of the changes in total fertility rates observed in low income countries since 1960,
14

and in Africa since 1980 (Schultz 1994). Even in an environment where economic progress has been
minimal since the 1960s – Kinshasa City in Congo – the increasing rate of female education is the key
factor explaining different levels of fertility across the population, and accounting for the decline in
overall fertility in the 1980s and 1990s (Shapiro and Tambashe 2000).
However, educated women could have lower fertility for many reasons, in addition to the
greater opportunity cost of their time in child rearing. The social and intellectual advantages that
educated women enjoy help them in deciphering, adopting and using effectively, new and old forms
of birth control, and thereby avoiding unwanted births.
Female schooling may also affect fertility through its impact on the risks of child mortality.
Censuses and surveys after World War II have documented for dozens of countries that child
mortality rates tend to be 5 to 10 percent lower for mothers who have completed an additional year
of schooling (Schultz 1981, 1997). However, the proportionate decline in fertility associated with
women’s education is larger than the proportionate increase in their child survival rates. Therefore,
better educated women have smaller numbers of surviving children, which implies they contribute less
to the overall rate of population growth than their less educated peers (Schultz 1994).
Education of women is also closely related to their labor force participation outside of their
family, holding constant for their husband’s income or education (Schultz 1981). Household models
of production and consumption generally assume that family labor supply choices are jointly
determined, and women’s education is expected to affect not only lifetime fertility, but also the timing
of marriage and the matching of the productive characteristics between husband and wife in the
marriage “market.” Within such a framework of family coordinated decision making, it is clearly
difficult to assess how one of these jointly determined life-cycle choices made by women affects
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another of their choices, as stressed earlier. To decompose the variation in fertility into that which
is due to the timing of marriage, marital fertility rates, and non-marital fertility rates is a suggestive
arithmetic exercise, but one that can misguide statistical analysis because the three components are
likely to be stochastically interdependent. Consequently, when analyses of fertility differentials during
the demographic transition focus only on marital fertility differentials, correlations can be causally
understood only if marriage behavior and fertility demands are behaviorally independent of each
other, a working assumption that few social scientists would adopt (Coale and Watkins 1986, Cleland
and Wilson 1987).
8.

Conclusions
Economic explanations for the fertility transition recognize the catalytic contribution of

increasing returns to schooling, especially for women, which has encouraged women’s education
relative to men’s, and fostered the rise in women’s wages. These attributes of development are not
equally evident in all countries. Declines in fertility have therefore proceeded quite unevenly, first
across the low income countries, but following a pattern of economic developments that has been
widely quantified in household surveys and suggestively followed in cross-country comparisons. At
an aggregate level, states have simultaneously legislated socialized support systems to provide for the
consumption requirements of the elderly, and for the school and health investment requirements of
the young, which may have also on balance, reduced the private demands of parents for children.
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